CreativeSoul: Degrees of certainty, if taken to their extreme logical conclusion, will sometimes result in nonsensical claims, such as we cannot know anything.

But this claim is NOT a nonsensical claim.

In fact, it is only nonsensical to the degree that inasmuch as empirical knowledge is concerned, we can only KNOW the existence of our own selves. All other knowledge is based on observation (of facts), logic (connecting the facts), and biasses (accepted knowledge as given to us by others, without our tracing them for truth). All three (observation, logic and biasses) are prone to error. Therefore other than the knowledge of self, all other knowledge is susceptible to be completely erroneous.

"True knowledge" is redundant use of terms, because there is no such thing as false knowledge. Belief, on the other hand, can be false.

Well. Belief as "no evidence to the contrary" can be false only after evidence is found to the contrary. Knowledge, on the other hand, can be falsified by finding new, more precise evidence.

The earth was flat, it was knowledge. It was not a belief due to lack of evidence (in the observations of man then.) You looked around the and the earth was NOT round. It was FLAT, everywhere you went. There was overwhelming observational evidence that the earth was flat. It was not belief, because there was lots of evidence to know this. If you said then, that the earth was round, or banana-shaped, or liek a long, narrow rod, there was plenty of evidence to the contrary that it was not round, not banana-shaped, not like a rod.

So... knowledge was false. What you were trying to say here is that "reality is true, always true", and that "true reality" is a redundant term. That I accept. But knowledge is man's internal working mental model of reality, and that knowledge can be false, and "true knowledge" therefore means "knowledge which is perfectly matching reality", which is not a redundant term.

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Belief, on the other hand, can only be false if evidence is found that shows that. That is, there is evidence found that belief was not actually corresponding with reality. But that does not make belief false. It annihilates the existence of belief. Once evidence is found, what it shows becomes knowledge. Knowledge depends on observation, partly, and belief depends on lack of observation. If there is observation, the topic ceases to be belief. It becomes knowledge.

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I quote you here:

"We have no good reason to believe that the world will end anytime sooner than later, especially given our frame of spatiotemporal reference. As a matter of certainty, one surely cannot say that s/he has MORE sufficient reason to believe that the sun will not rise tomorrow morning. I mean, what reason is there to doubt that it will given that it has everyday of my life that I've paid attention? "

"As a matter of certainty, one surely cannot say that s/he has MORE sufficient reason to believe that the sun will not rise tomorrow morning." This is true, but it does not refute what I said. I said knowledge is not an on-off state. You say, it is more likely that the sun will rise tomorrow, than not rise. That is true, and it does not stand in contradiction with my statement. You are using the same measuring scale of truth, actually, the graduated scale. You admit that there is a chance, but the chance is small. That's been my claim, too.

"I mean, what reason is there to doubt that it will given that it has everyday of my life that I've paid attention? "

This is absolutely noncomforming to language, the entire passage. Sorry, it makes no sense. I apologize, but this is what you said.

Well, all doubt is removed by pointing at the thing. If we were speaking in person, I would point at one who has red hair and say something like "That is red hair"----->




I disagree. "Red hair" is the name for that----->





I would agree that red hair is not knowledge, but that's not what I'm claiming. Red hair is a thing. Knowing what "red hair" is does constitute being a bit of knowledge. I know what "red hair" is because I know that they are words in the English language used to denote that----->

I know what red hair is because I how to use the words "red hair" correctly as a means for denoting that----> Red hair is the thing that "red hair" denotes.

Are you denying that?




This is patently false. It contradicts everyday fact, as it occurs. A pre-linguistic child can - and does - learn that touching fire causes pain without ever uttering the statement "touching fire causes pain". So, it is clear that something can be known without being expressed as a statement. It subsequently follows that statements are not the only things which are truth-apt.

Are you willing to deny that tt is the case that a prelinguistic child can know that touching fire causes pain without language, and thus without expressing what is known with a statement? I'm not.

In order for you and I to talk about it must be expressed with language(statements), but that's another matter altogether and it doesn't serve us to conflate them.




You've already claimed this, and I've already addressed it. There are two significant problems here...

1."It does not have predictive value" does not follow from what was written, so this looks like an odd use of "therefore".

2.The claim that knowledge must have predictive value has already been refuted. It doesn't matter whether or not "X" has predictive value, because not all knowledge does. There are numerous examples to the contrary, because fact/reality clearly shows us otherwise.


Here's what you're arguing...

p1. Knowledge must have predictive value
p2. "I know what red hair is" does not have predictive value
C. "I know what red hair is" is not knowledge

That is a perfectly logical/valid argument. However, validity is insufficient for truth. Logic presupposes truth. False premisses cannot validly lead to true conclusions, and vice-versa. That being said...

"Knowledge must have a predictive value" is presupposed within your premisses(definitions). I'm saying that that premiss/definition is clearly false. The argument rests upon a dubious presuppositon. I've already given a simple counter-example, which you've claimed does not have predictive value, and I would agree. That was exactly the point being made. It is justified true belief(knowledge). It has no predictive value. Therefore, not all knowledge has predictive value.

So, we're forced to make a decision here. Either we admit that I have acquired and possess knowledge of what red hair is, or we deny that I know what red hair is.

The latter is inconceivable. I mean, claiming that it is not a bit of knowledge simply because it does not have predictive value doesn't pass the muster test, as has been shown now with two completely different examples either of which adequately deny that claim. If we conclude that I do not know what red hair is based upon the absence of predictive value, then we must also conclude that I do not know what a tree is, what a book is, what a computer is, what a hand is, etc. Knowing the names of things, has no predictive value. There can also be no written predictive value without first knowing the names of things.

Thus, it makes much more sense to me to say that I know what red hair is. That bit of knowledge, in and of itself, has no predictive value. However, it is a true statement about the way things are, and I believe that statement. I can, and have, justified that statement as well.



I refuted the idea that knowledge has predictive value by showing a bit which has none. Not all knowledge has predictive value.

Not a good sign. Here's what I'm arguing regarding that...

There are numerous claims that cannot be falsified due to the nature of the claim. The flying spaghetti monster comes immediately to mind. With such cases, it only follows that there can be no evidence to the contrary. Thus, lack of evidence to the contrary is insufficient reason for assent. If that were not the case, we would all believe all unfalsifiable claims. We do not.

I meant what I wrote and not what you implied I ought to have meant. I know what "necessary conditions" means.





I simply claimed that a lack of evidence to the contrary is insufficient for belief. I stand by that claim.

This is becoming rather incoherent(self-contradictory). I mean, the cogito has problems in and of itself, but rather than argue against it, I'll grant the argument. The aforementioned problem of incoherency is revealed by our knowing something(anything). Knowing of the existence of ourselves is knowing something.

I claimed that "we can know nothing" is nonsense. I stand by that claim. For reasons already given, any argument which logically leads to such a conclusion ought be given further due attention, because something is wrong somewhere. True premisses cannot validly lead to false conclusions, and "we can know nothing" is false. It is impossible for it to be true, for if it were true it would falsify itself.




You're conflating knowledge of self and knowledge of the existence of oneself. They are not the same bit of knowledge. Knowledge of self is socially influenced; how one identifies themself and is strongly affected by personal value assessment/attribution. Whereas knowledge of one's existence requires no personal value assessment/attribution.

We know that we are susceptible to error. It does not follow that we cannot acquire and/or possess justified true belief.

I know that this is a hand, and here is yet another. These are called "hands".

This claim is false.

A belief and/or statement is false regardless of whether it has been falsified. Falsification requires knowledge to the contrary. Being false does not. There is an important distinction which need drawn between being false and being falsified.

I've already said what needed to be said regarding the inherent weakness of basing belief upon lack of evidence to the contrary. My counter-arguments stand without comment.





Let us think carefully about what is being claimed here.

There is no good reason whatsoever for us to say now that the earth was flat then. That is nonsense. Folk believed then that the earth was flat. They used things as evidence to support that view. They believed that the earth was flat. It was not.

They were mistaken.

I strongly reject your conclusion above. They did not know that the earth was flat. Rather, they believed that it was. They did not have knowledge, they had justified false belief. "The earth is flat" cannot be known because the earth is not flat.





Another bad sign. This is neither what I've claimed, nor something that I would.





I say that there is no such thing as "knowledge which is perfectly matching reality". I can be swayed though.

Can you give an example of this "true knowledge"?





This is confused. I observe what I believe to be an air balloon.





Predictions are not knowledge, they are belief about what may come.

On my view, thought/belief and/or statements about reality are true, false, and/or neither. Your prediction was neither because it had yet to have happened. The above was my response to your knowledge claim that the sun would rise the following day. The problem is that that was not a bit of knowledge, because it had not yet happened. It was justified belief, for the aforementioned reasons.

Drawing the distinction between justified belief and knowledge...

I have sufficient reason to believe that the sun will rise in the morrow. I'm justified in holding that belief. The possibility, however remote, still exists that my belief about the events of tomorrow will turn out false. That and that alone does not deny the idea that I know that the sun will rise tomorrow. Rather, what denies that the status of being knowledge is that it is not true.

Knowledge must be true. If it were not necessary for knowledge to be true, then we would be able to say, without problem, that we STILL know that the world is flat.