Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.

Prop. III. Things, which have nothing in common, cannot be one the cause of the other.

Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substance, or by the differences of their modifications.

Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes.

Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

Prop. XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature and is not constrained by anyone.

Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal.

Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

Prop. XXI. All things, which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

Prop. XXII. Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.

Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite.

Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

Prop. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

Prop. XXVI. A thing, which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.

Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

Prop. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.

Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Prop. XXX. Intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else.

Prop. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to passive nature, and not to active nature.

Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause.

Prop. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.

Prop. XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence.

Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists.

Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow.

Here are the definitions of terminology according to Spinoza. One must keep these in mind when reading Spinoza's theory, in order to not be confused by a possible mis-interpretation of meaning...


DEFINITIONS.

I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.

II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

V. By mode, I mean the modifications ["Affectiones"] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
Explanation.--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.

VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.
Explanation.--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived

This is a completely a priori inductive line of reasoning. Granted, it is over 300 years old, but it is still quite remarkable in so many ways. Spinoza's attempt was to make a logically sound inductive argument for the existance of the 'God' of the Bible. Although his argument is sound, it does not represent the 'God' of the Bible, at least in my opinion.

This thread was re-visited by myself in hopes that others could witness for themselves what is meant by an a priori knowledge based inductively sound thesis on 'God'.


This particular quote has reminded me of an earlier claim, I wonder if it still follows...

I just check a book out at the library. I start reading about his ethic. I did not read easy.

Take Care... I come back if I get some reading in.

TAB

Spinoza's on target with some of it and off base with others. Some of his propositions here seem a little contradictory. Philosophy was a difficult subject to tackle 25 years ago and I see that not much has changed. It'd be ok if there wasn't so much darned THINKING involved!